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Fodor’s radical concept nativism flowed from his view that hypothesis testing is the only 
route to concept acquisition. Many have successfully objected to the overly-narrow 
restriction to learning by hypothesis testing. Existing representations can be connected to a 
new representational vehicle so as to constitute a sustaining mechanism for a new 
representation, without the new representation thereby being constituted by or structured 
out of the old. This paper argues that there is also a deeper objection. Connectionism 
shows that a more fundamental assumption underpinning the debate can also be rejected: 
the assumption that the development of a new representation must be explained in 
content-involving terms if innateness is to be avoided. 
Fodor has argued that connectionism offers no new resources to explain concept 
acquisition: unless it is merely an uninteresting claim about neural implementation, 
connectionism’s defining commitment to distributed representations reduces to the claim 
that some representations are structured out of others (which is the old, problematic 
research programme). Examination of examples of representational development in 
connectionist networks shows, however, that some such models explain the development of 
new representational capacities in non-representational terms. They illustrate the 
possibility of representational development that is not explicable-by-content. Connectionist 
representations can be distributed in an important sense, which is incompatible with the 
assumption of explanation-by-content: they can be distributed over non-representational 
resources that account for their development. Rejecting the assumption of explanation-by-
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(1) Introduction 
How can new representations be acquired? When that question is asked about new 
concepts, Fodor famously argued that hypothesis testing is the only option (Fodor 1975, 
1981). That led him to embrace radical concept nativism.1 Many objectors have pointed out 
that hypothesis testing is not the only candidate learning mechanism (Carey 2009, Cowie 
1999, Laurence  & Margolis 2002), showing how existing representations can be involved in 
the acquisition of new ones without the new representations thereby being structured out 
of the old (Margolis 1998, Rupert 2001).2 This paper argues that the point runs deeper. The 
development of a new representation need not be explicable in content-involving terms at 
all. It may proceed by putting together non-representational resources in such a way as to 
constitute an entirely new representation. 
Most answers to Fodor’s challenge rely on existing representational resources in 
explaining the development of a new representation type. For example, a new natural kind 
term can be acquired by recognising salient properties of an object, connecting them with 
a new internal symbol, and combining that with an essentialist principle (Margolis 1998). 
Such accounts are important in their own right, but do not challenge the tacit assumption 
that, if innateness is to be avoided, representational development must consist in a series 
of stages or transitions that are explicable in terms of the semantic content of the 
representations involved. Connectionist systems offer an excellent illustration of the more 
radical claim. Fittingly, Fodor’s robust challenge to the usefulness of connectionist 
modelling brings out the central role that an assumption of explanation-by-content is 
playing in his arguments. 
  One of Fodor’s challenges to connectionism is characteristically pithy: connectionists’ 
defining characteristic is a commitment to distributed representations — over what are 
they distributed?  At best, Fodor argues, connectionists can be saying nothing more than 
that connectionist representations are distributed over further representations, those found 
at the level of their processing units (section 2).  But if so, connectionism is nothing new.  
It is just a restatement of the old programme in which new representations are complex 
constructs out of innate primitives.  For present purposes we can concede to Fodor that 
that programme has been unsuccessful, especially as an account of lexical concepts. 
 Fodor’s challenge forces us to be very precise about what connectionism should say 
about the development of new representations.  This paper examines some examples to 
show that even static feedforward PDP models provide a genuinely novel way of seeing the 
development of new representational resources.  They show us how there can be a non-
representational but informational explanation of the development of entirely new 
                                                 
1  Fodor has since retreated somewhat from that position: Fodor (1998, 2008), including becoming more 
sympathetic to alternatives to hypothesis testing as an account of concept acquisition (Fodor 2008, pp. 162-
168). 
2  Fodor now accepts that such processes do not depend on hypothesis testing (Fodor 2008), but still argues 
that they form part of a creature’s innate conceptual endowment (2008, pp. 163-164). 
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primitive representations (section 3).  Connectionism’s interesting distribution claim is that 
representations can be distributed over the entities that account for their development 
(section 4).  That is perhaps the most important theoretical insight offered by PDP 
modelling. 
 At first sight, Fodor’s challenge to connectionism appears to be independent of his 
argument for radical concept nativism.  On examination, they both turn out to depend upon 
the same tacit assumption: that if the development of a new representation is to fall within 
the ambit of psychology, it must occur as a rational transition or inference between 
semantic items, explicable in virtue of their contents (it must be ‘explicable-by-content’).  
Connectionist models of representational development show that there can be a 
psychological explanation of the transition to a new representation that is not an 
explanation-by-content.  That point generalises into a tactic for answering Fodor’s puzzle 
of radical concept nativism in other cases (section 5).  However, the nativists had a good 
point too, because it would be a mistake to think, as many connectionists have, that the 
acquisition of new representational resources is to be explained in terms of their contents.  
The grain of truth in Fodor’s radical concept nativism is that, for very many of the 
representations that are responsible for intelligent behaviour, their development is not 
explicable-by-content.  His mistake was to conclude that they must therefore be innate. 
Fodor’s innateness argument concerns concepts. Concepts are one species of mental 
representation. They are constituents of complete thoughts.  Complete thoughts have 
associated conditions of satisfaction or truth/correctness.  Concepts, taken alone, do not.  
Fodor hypothesises a language of thought, such that all mental representations with 
conditions of truth/correctness or satisfaction are formed out of constituent concepts.  
Representationalism is more permissive allowing, for example, that there are 
representations which have satisfaction conditions that we would express using a sentence 
(eg, there is a snake on the ground, climb a tree), but where the representation itself 
contains no constituent structure (nothing in the representation corresponds separately to 
the ground, snakes or climbing).  I will use the term ‘non-conceptual representation’ for 
psychological states with correctness or satisfaction conditions but no constituent 
structure.  Non-conceptual representations are probably needed to understand many 
classes of PDP model, as well as many psychological phenomena.  Although Fodor talks 
about concepts, the considerations he canvasses in support of nativism are equally 
applicable to non-conceptual representations.  So I will move freely between talking about 
concepts and representations in general. 
 
 
(2) Fodor’s Argument Against Connectionism 
Fodor has several objections to connectionism.  The most well-known is that connectionist 
models cannot explain the systematicity and productivity of thought (Fodor and McLauglin 
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1990).  Also prominent is the claim that connectionists cannot avoid an unacceptably holist 
theory of the content of distributed representations (Fodor and Lepore 1992).  My focus is a 
third objection: that connectionism is nothing new.  According to Fodor, all it has to offer 
is the standard idea that some mental representations are structured out of others, coupled 
with an outdated associationism about mental processing (Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988).  
Supposed theoretical insights, like the idea of distributed representation, and of learning 
by modulation of connection strengths, are simply new pieces of terminology for old ideas, 
terminology that obscures the failings inherent in treating lexical concepts as structured, 
but does nothing to address them. 
 The argument can be formulated as a dilemma.3  Connectionists claim that mental 
representations are distributed.  What type of objects are they distributed over?  
Characteristically, Fodor offers a dichotomy: 
 
Version One: Mental representations are distributed over neurons.4 
Version Two: Some mental representations are distributed over others.5 
 
According to Version One, connectionism is just a claim about how mental 
representations are realised.  Any psychological theory must be realised somehow in 
physical brains.  No one thinks that all mental representations correspond to individual 
neurons or “grandmother cells”.  To be of theoretical interest, connectionists need to make 
some claims that connect with the explanatory level of psychology.  So Fodor argues. 
PDP modellers themselves are unlikely to accept the Version One characterisation. Of 
course when the models are applied to the real world, representations will be realized in 
multiple neurons. But the units over which representations are distributed in the models 
are not neurons. PDP modellers often explicitly eschew a commitment to a 1-1 
correspondence between processing units and neurons. Version One therefore does not 
capture the force of PDP’s distribution claim. 
Fodor offers Version Two as the only alternative.  But this is just a familiar story 
about structured representations.  Connectionists’ distributed representations are merely 
some kind of complex constructs out of the representations that are their constituent units.  
For example, Fodor and colleagues interpret Churchland’s “state space semantics” 
(Churchland 1998, 2012) as treating individual hidden layer units as representing complex 
microfeatures, with a distributed pattern of activation having its content as some kind of 
complex weighted conjunction of these microfeatures (Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988, § 2.1.4; 
Fodor and Lepore 1999, p. 391).  Distributed representations are structured out of the 
                                                 
3  This objection to both the versions of connectionism offered here has been raised by Fodor in many places, 
e.g. in Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) and Fodor and McLaughlin (1990).  The formulation explicitly in terms of a 
dilemma is found in Fodor (2004), a draft paper posted on the New York University website. 
4  Fodor and Pylyshyn (1990), § 5.6. 
5  Fodor and Pylyshyn (1990), § 2.1.4. 
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representations over which they are distributed, and the content of a distributed 
representation is fixed by the contents of the constituent units. 
 Fodor rejects Version Two on the basis that constructing concepts out of pre-existing 
representations is a failed research programme.  He argues that there are no plausible 
definitions for most lexical concepts, and that neither prototypes nor exemplars compose in 
the way that is required by a compositional semantics.  Connectionists can, and often do, 
object at this stage.  Fodor’s objections to prototype and exemplar theories may be 
surmountable.  Or the connectionist’s way of constructing distributed representations out 
of the contents of individual nodes may be different in important respects, so as to 
overcome extant objections.  Furthermore, “constructivist” neural networks side-step the 
worry about constructing distributed representations out of existing microfeatures since 
they allow for the recruitment of new hidden units that previously played no role in the 
network (Mareschal & Schultz 1996, Quartz & Sejnowski 1997). 
 These lines of reply to Fodor are familiar.  They may be the best way to characterise 
some classes of connectionist models.  But there is another answer available too.  Fodor’s 
dilemma presupposes that there are only two candidates for the entities over which mental 
representations are distributed: neurons or further representations.  To have any bite 
connectionists do indeed have to tell us what it is that distributed representations are 
distributed over.  But Fodor has offered connectionists a false dichotomy.  To see that 
there is another possibility we must first get on the table a positive account of the 
development of new representations in connectionist systems. 
 
 
(3) Developing New Connectionist Representations 
Even static, programmer-designed neural networks can develop novel representations.  This 
section gives an account of how.  In particular, it shows how familiar training algorithms 
can transform a system without representations into one that has representational 
capacities. 
 The basic idea is that there are connectionist learning algorithms that transform 
information into representation.  Before a connectionist system has been trained, the units 
of its hidden layers, and perhaps its input layer too, can be merely information-carriers.  
Their tokening will correlate with various features of the items coded as input.  When the 
instantiation of some property F by an object changes the probability of the instantiation of 
another property G by an object, we can say that F carries correlational information about 
G.  Correlational information is ubiquitous.  Representation is something more substantial.  
The fact that single units and distributed patterns of activation carry correlational 
information (about all sorts of affairs) does not imply that they have representational 
content.  Typically, it is only after training that distributed patterns of activation have the 
right properties to have genuinely representational content (truth conditions, satisfaction 
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conditions, etc.).  Of course, there is no agreement as to exactly what more is needed, but 
all sides agree that bare correlational information is not sufficient for representation. 
 Connectionists need not think of individual units as being representational at all.  
Indeed, Chalmers (1992) takes that to be characteristic of connectionist models: the items 
over which computational processes are defined are more fine-grained than the lowest 
level at which representational contents are properly attributable to states of the system.  
(Some networks are designed to have individual units as representational, e.g. the semantic 
networks of Quillian 1967.)  Connectionists have tended to accept that individual units 
represent something (e.g. complex microfeatures), when they need not.  That takes 
connectionism towards the Version Two interpretation and its attendant problems.  In fact, 
in many networks there is no reason to think of individual units as representational at all. 
 An example is the colour classification network of Laakso and Cottrell (2000).  One 
way of coding the inputs there proceeded as follows.  For a given colour patch, reflectance 
readings from a spectrophotometer were taken at 12 places on the electromagnetic 
spectrum (between wavelengths of 400nm and 700nm, at 25nm intervals).  The readings 
were normalised to the range 0-255 and converted into binary format (eg, 11010011), giving 
a list of 12 binary numbers for each colour sample.  This list of binary numbers was 
converted into a 96-dimensional vector of 0s and 1s to act as input vector (96 = 12 binary 
numbers of 8 digits).  In that coding it is very hard to see an individual one of the 96 input 
units as representing anything at all.  The particular 0 or 1 it carries makes sense only as 
part of a binary representation of magnitude that is distributed across 8 units.  So even at 
the input layer there are cases where the individual units are not representational and only 
distributed patterns of activation are. 
 The case is even clearer when we come to hidden layers.  There are good reasons, in 
many classes of model, not to treat single units of a hidden layer as representational.  It is 
a mistake to concede that individual hidden layer units represent some kind of complex 
microfeatures.  Shea (2007b) describes a class of connectionist systems in which individual 
hidden layer units are not representational.  The networks do feature distributed 
representations. However the representations are distributed over network units, not over 
further representations.  In other cases, the representations may be dynamic attractors in 
activation space (Clark 2001, p. 135, e.g. McLeod et al. 2000), making the representational 
level even further removed from the individual units in a single layer.  Importantly, an 
explanation of how new representations develop (in those cases, how clusters or dynamic 
attractors develop in hidden layer state space) is given at the level of individual units. 
 So individual units in a connectionist network may not be representations: individual 
hidden layer units are unlikely to have representational content before training, and in 
many cases individual input layer units do not have representational content at all.  But 
notice that each individual unit will carry correlational information, both before and after 
training (indeed, units will carry information about very many properties of the samples 
that have been coded into inputs).  In many connectionist networks, training encourages 
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the network to form representations.6  Some simple examples bring out the point.  
Competitive networks use unsupervised learning to find clusters in the inputs on which they 
are trained (Rolls and Treves 1998, ch. 4).  Unsupervised learning in auto-associative 
networks can also serve to identify the central tendencies or prototypes found in a range in 
input data, even where the prototype itself was never encountered in training (Plunkett 
and Sinha 1992).  Both start with bare correlational information and end up with vehicles 
(clusters, prototypes) that are plausibly representations. 
 The point about the development of new representations can be made most starkly in 
networks in which there is no representation at all at the level of individual units before 
training, like the examples above.  But that is not essential.  The absence of initial 
representations just serves to make it obvious that the way that new representational 
capacities develop is not explicable-by-content.  Representational development in these 
cases is a matter of using statistical learning to build mere information-bearers into 
representations.  In other cases, pre-existing resources that are representations play a role 
in this process.  What is crucial is that their role is merely causal.  The way a new 
representational type develops, at a hidden layer say, depends on the correlational 
information carried by input units and hidden units, but there is no rational or content-
based explanation of the transition from initial resources to new representations.  Existing 
resources like the input units are relied on for the correlational information they carry, on 
which the connectionist training algorithm can act; but the story of the building of the new 
representational capacities is causal-correlational, not representational. 
 
Application to an Example 
To discuss a widely-known example, Sejnowski and Rosenberg’s (1987) NETtalk network was 
trained using supervised learning to map English text to phonetic representations of its 
pronunciation.  Where networks undergo supervised learning, clusters may form in hidden 
layer state space, leading to new distributed representations at the hidden layer.  In 
NETtalk, before training there were no relevant partitions or clusters in hidden layer state 
space (although distributed patterns of activation would necessarily have carried some 
correlational information from the outset).  The result of training the network to produce 
correct representations of phonemes at the output layer was that the network learnt to 
categorise inputs into vowels and consonants at the hidden layer on the way. 
 According to two representative theories of content, asymmetric dependence theory 
and infotel semantics, this process leads to the creation of new representations out of non-
representational resources.  Learning a new representation of Cs is a matter of acquiring a 
new mental item R with the right properties firstly, to count as a mental symbol, and 
secondly to have the content C.  According to Fodor’s asymmetric dependence theory of 
                                                 
6  There are many examples in which learning in connectionist systems creates attractors or clusters in state 
space (Churchland & Sejnowski 1992, Rupert 1998, 2001, Tiffany 1999). If there are reasons to see those 
attractors as being representations, then this is a process of turning information into representation. 
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content, having a representation R with content C is a matter of having a mental symbol 
whose tokening covaries with the presence of Cs, and of asymmetric dependence: to the 
extent that the tokening of R also covaries with any other property C*, it would not so-
covary if R did not also covary with C (Fodor 1990).  Call the mechanism which puts R in the 
right relation of causal covariation and counterfactual dependence with C a sustaining 
mechanism (Cowie 1999, p. 101; Laurence & Margolis 2002).  Fodor’s theory of content has 
faced many objections, and Fodor doesn’t seem particularly keen on it himself,7 but taking 
it at face value, learning a new representation of C is just a matter of going through a 
psychological acquisition process which results in a sustaining mechanism that connects a 
new symbol type R with Cs (with the appropriate causal profile). 
 Applying the asymmetric dependence theory to NETtalk, it is reasonably clear that 
there is no representation in the hidden layer at the outset, when connection weights are 
set randomly or arbitrarily.  From the outset, both input and hidden layer units will carry a 
variety of correlational information, but there is no basis for thinking that there are any 
relations of asymmetric dependence amongst these correlations.  After training, activation 
of the vowel partition of hidden layer state space correlates with presentation of a vowel 
to the network.  It also correlates with other properties of the stimulus, say with the 
stimulus being a letter with a certain disjunctively-specified shape S.  But that correlation 
is plausibly asymmetrically dependent on the correlation with vowels — were it not for the 
correlation with vowels, which is a useful intermediate to the classification made at the 
output layer, the network would not have arrived at a correlation with shape S. 
 For contrast, we can also assess the representational contents in NETtalk using infotel 
semantics (Shea 2007a), a modification of teleosemantics (Millikan 1984; Papineau 1987).  
Infotel semantics looks at the way a representation is used, as well as the way it is 
produced, in fixing its content.  Out of all the correlational information carried by a 
putative representation, it focuses on the correlation that accounts for the system’s having 
been trained (or evolved) to behave as it does (as argued by Dretske 1998; Ryder 2004 
deploys a related idea).  Applied to PDP models, this will deliver as content a condition 
specific to each representation-type, such that keeping track of that condition is what 
enables the network to produce correct outputs (where correctness is the standard against 
which the learning algorithm was trained). 
 Applied to NETtalk, infotel semantics implies that the output layer represents 
phonemes: in the course of training, the modeller took the units to represent phonemes, 
using that as the standard against which to generate an error signal.  At the hidden layer, 
before training we have only correlational information.  After training we have a partition 
of activation space into two groups of distributed patterns.  Each correlates with a relevant 
feature of the input (vowel vs. consonant), and that distinction is consumed in downstream 
                                                 
7  ‘I assume that intentional content reduces (in some way or other, but, please, don’t ask me how) to 
information; this is, I suppose, the most deniable thesis of my bundle.’ (Fodor 1994, p. 4).  ‘If you want an 
externalist metaphysics of the content of innate concepts that’s not just bona fide but true, I’m afraid there 
isn’t one “yet”.’  Fodor (2001), p. 137. 
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processing as a means to further phonetic categorisation.  So according to infotel semantics 
there are representations in the hidden layer after training, but there is only correlational 
information before. 
 Notice that in this case, although there are representations at the input layer 
throughout (of strings of text), their role in fixing the content of the new representations 
(vowel vs. consonant) formed at the hidden layer is merely causal.  It is not as if vowel, 
say, has been defined as some complex property of strings of text.  Instead, input 
encodings of words into text strings serve as the causal basis for a sustaining mechanism 
that connects clusters at the hidden layer with properties of words.  There is no 
explanation-by-content of the transition from a non-representational hidden layer, before 
training, to representations of vowels and consonants at the hidden layer, after training. 
 
(4) Connectionism’s Interesting Distribution Claim 
Armed with this account of the way connectionist networks can develop novel 
representations out of non-representational resources, we can return to Fodor’s dilemma: 
what are connectionist representations distributed over?   
 In cases like the hidden layer representations in NETtalk, distributed representations 
are the lowest level of grain at which representational contents are properly attributable to 
the system.  This fits Chalmers’ (1992) observation that computational processes go on at a 
more fine-grained level (individual units) than the lowest level at which representations are 
found (distributed patterns of activation).  Similarly, the story about how new 
representations develop is located at the more fine-grained level of single units.  It is a 
recognisably psychological story, a form of statistical learning based on the way activation 
of units correlates with external features, and on correlations in activation between units. 
 We can clearly distinguish between the two levels of grain: one at which 
representations are found, another which figures in an account of the development of new 
representations.8  That is, we can distinguish between ways of carving the network up into 
individuals for two different purposes:- 
 
Obj1. Vehicles of representational content — individuals that figure in a 
representational explanation of the synchronic online operation of the 
trained system. 
Obj2. Developmental units — individuals that figure in an explanation of the 
development of new representations. 
 
 Fodor’s argument against connectionism assumes that Obj1=Obj2.  But connectionists 
can make a much more interesting claim: that Obj1 are distributed over Obj2.  The objects 
over which representations are distributed are not further representations (Version Two 
                                                 
8  Tiffany (1999) and Shea (2007b) make parallel claims about the vehicles of content. 
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connectionism).  Nor are they something merely implementational like neurons (Version 
One connectionism), since Obj2 are individuals which do figure in a psychological 
explanation (of the development of new representations).  The interesting connectionist 
claim is that representations can be distributed over the resources that lead to their 
development.  That is a clear sense in which connectionists’ commitment to distributed 
representations is something new.  It breaks away from an assumption that is deeply 
entrenched in classical computational models — that development of new representations 
must take place over existing representational resources.  In this way, connectionist 
modelling has furnished cognitive science with a genuine insight, opening up a previously 
unexplored portion of logical space. 
 There would be good reason to assume Obj1 = Obj2 if we were committed to the idea 
that the development of a new representation must be explained in contentful terms: as an 
inference or rational transition that makes sense in the light of the semantic content of the 
objects involved in that transition.  That is to reject the possibility that individual units 
may have a causal role in the development of a new distributed representation in virtue of 
the correlational information they carry, not constituting its content directly, but instead 
forming a sustaining mechanism which gives rise to its content.  That is, Fodor’s dichotomy 
implicitly assumes that the development of a new representation must be explicable-by-
content: 
 
Assumption of explanation-by-content 
Whenever it occurs by a psychological process, the development of a new 
representation must consist of a transition from existing representational resources to 
the new representation, explicable in terms of the contents of the respective 
representations. 
 
 When new representations develop in PDP models in the way analysed in the previous 
section, it is clear that Obj1 are distributed over Obj2.  The identification of Obj1 with 
Obj2 is a substantive assumption that has been implicitly constraining theorising in 
cognitive science.  It is motivated by the assumption of explanation-by-content.  That 




(5) Avoiding Fodor’s Argument For Radical Concept Nativism 
But what about Fodor’s argument for radical concept nativism?  We have seen how even 
static connectionist models can account for the development of entirely novel 
representations.  They are not innate: PDP models offer an account of their development, 
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and does so in recognisably psychological terms.9  How, then, is Fodor’s argument avoided? 
At first pass, Fodor’s argument that connectionism offers nothing new seems quite 
separate from his argument for radical concept nativism.  In this section we will see that 
Fodor’s argument for radical concept nativism is in fact underpinned by the same 
assumption that lay behind his identification of Obj1 with Obj2 in the last section.  
Connectionism’s insight is to show why that assumption can be rejected.  In this section we 
spell out how doing so side-steps Fodor’s nativism puzzle. 
 Fodor argues that concepts are either constructed from primitives or they are innate.  
His view is that most lexical concepts — concepts at the level of grain of individual words — 
are not constructed out of primitives.  So they are innate, which is to say that they are not 
acquired via a learning process.  Why does Fodor think that learning can only consist in 
constructing new representations out of existing ones?  Not all ways of acquiring a new 
representation count as learning.  Neither a bump on the head nor clever neurosurgery are 
learning processes, so if new representations could be acquired in either of those ways they 
would not be learnt.  By contrast, setting a parameter for a grammatical principle, 
detecting a correlation, and constructing a new prototype based on experience are all clear 
cases of learning.  Fodor argues that they all involve testing a hypothesis about what is the 
case: that the ambient grammar is head-first, that A correlates with B, that birds typically 
have feathers.  To test a hypothesis against experience, the learner has first to be able to 
represent the hypothesis.  So hypothesis testing cannot be a way of acquiring genuinely 
new representational resources, ones whose expressive power extends beyond contents 
that can be constructing out of pre-existing representations. 
 The standard response is that not all learning mechanisms are forms of hypothesis 
testing.  That answer is correct, but it is incomplete, because it doesn’t tell us what 
learning processes look like that are not hypothesis testing.10  Fodor’s move equating 
learning with hypothesis testing is not just an observation about what learning happens to 
consist in.  It goes deeper.  The claim is that learning can only consist in rational transitions 
between representations (Fodor 1975, p. 36).  If that were right, then a person would 
indeed need to be able to formulate a claim before they could learn that it was true, which 
would exclude a learning-based account of the acquisition of entirely novel 
representations.  That presents a puzzle, since it is implausible that my concepts of a 
carburettor (CARBURETTOR) or of my friend John (JOHN) are innate.11 
                                                 
9  The concept of innateness is notoriously problematic (Mameli 2008). Fodor’s central concern is whether 
concepts are learnt (Fodor 1975, 1991, 1998, 2008; Cowie 1999; Samuels 2002), so here I will take it that 
innate representations are not learnt or acquired by a psychological process and that they admit of a 
poverty of the stimulus argument (Shea 2012a, 2012b). 
10  Margolis (1998), Rupert (2001), Laurence & Margolis (2002) and Carey (2009) give detailed accounts of forms 
of concept learning that are not a matter of hypothesis testing. 
11  Fodor has softened slightly in more recent work. First he allowed that concepts themselves may not be 
innate – what is innate is, for each concept, a domain-specific disposition, specific to each such concept, to 
acquire that concept (Fodor 1998).  But this still leaves Fodor postulating an innate domain-specific ability 
to develop DOORKNOB as a result of interaction with doorknobs. He has since added that the innate 
endowment might determine the geometry of neural attractor landscapes that realise concepts (Fodor 2008, 
p. 164).  The worry remains that far too much is being taken to be innate.  For simplicity, this paper 
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 Several authors have suggested a strategy for answering Fodor’s innateness puzzle 
(Macnamara 1986, Margolis 1998, Rupert 2001, Laurence & Margolis 2002).  Assume that 
what makes a representation have the content it does is wholly or partly determined by its 
causal relations with things in the world.  Such sustaining mechanisms for a representation 
R may depend, causally, on other representations R* without the content of R being 
determined by the content of the R* — R’s content is fixed more directly by its causal 
relations with things in the world.  R can then be atomic, neither structured nor 
constructed out of the R*.  The anti-nativist tactic is to give a psychological story in which 
existing representations R* come to form the sustaining mechanism for a new 
representation R, where the process of forming the new representation type R is described 
merely causally, not as a content-driven process like inference. 
 The key to this strategy is that not all learning consists in rational transitions between 
representations.  Fodor’s commitment to explanation-by-content closes off that option 
(driving him toward innateness).  And we can see why Fodor would think learning is 
restricted in that way.  The central insight of cognitive science is the viability of content-
based explanation — the explanation of behaviour in terms of rational transitions between 
mental representations.  The reality of these mental processes is vindicated by causal 
transitions between representation tokens in virtue of their form, but explanatory purchase 
is achieved by describing such representations in terms of their content.  Rational 
transitions between contentful representations are the very core of the representational 
theory of mind (and its offshoot, the computational theory of mind / language of thought).  
So it is natural that Fodor should think that all psychological processes must consist in 
transformations between mental representations that are explicable in terms of the 
content of those representations. 
 If all learning processes were like that, then Fodor would be right to claim that any 
way of acquiring new representations that did not relate them to existing representations 
would necessarily lie outside the explanatory ambit of psychology. We have seen a first 
response to Fodor in accounts where the development of new representations depends 
upon existing representations without the new representation being structured or 
constructed out of the old (Margolis 1998, Laurence & Margolis 2002, Rupert 2001). But we 
can go further and reject the deeper underpinnings of Fodor’s argument if we can reject 
the assumption of explanation-by-content entirely.12 We must show how there can be 
instances of learning that are susceptible to a recognisably psychological explanation, but 
which do not fit within the standard mould where the outcome (a new representation) can 
be explained as a rational transition from existing resources. The transition to a genuinely 
                                                                                                                                            
considers only Fodor’s earlier innateness claim. 
12  Fodor has more recently accepted that these accounts of concept learning do not involve hypothesis testing 
(Fodor 2008, pp. 163-167), and even that there is a ‘jump’ from the existing representations that are 
involved in creating the prototype: ‘we jump, by some or other “automatic” process, from our stereotypes 
to our concepts’ (2008, p. 164). However, he does not draw the moral that there are psychological 
acquisition processes that are not explicable-by-content; indeed, he argues that the way this process works 
is due to innate constraints (2008, p. 164). 
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novel contentful item cannot itself be susceptible to explanation in terms of content. 
 Our account of the development of new representations in the PDP models in section 
3 above is an existence proof that there can be such cases.  It escapes Fodor’s argument for 
radical representational nativism by rejecting his implicit commitment to explanation-by-
content.  That commitment can now be seen to lie behind both his radical concept nativism 
and his rejection of connectionism.  But once PDP modelling has opened up this portion of 
logical space, it becomes clear that other cases of representational development should be 
understood in the same way. Shea (2011) has argued that Carey’s influential account of 
children’s development of the concept of natural number (Carey 2009) also involves a step 
that is not explicable-by-content.13 Below I offer an example that goes beyond 
connectionism to illustrate that this could be a more general phenomenon. 
 
Face Recognition 
Morton & Johnson’s (1991) theory of the development of face recognition furnishes a 
further useful example of how acquisition could fashion representations out of purely non-
representational resources.  Tested 30 minutes after being born, infants show a tendency 






This tendency seems to be innate, in the sense that no learning is involved in the infant 
coming to have the looking bias. A poverty-of-the-stimulus argument can be made about it. 
The infant’s disposition preferentially to track this category of inputs (perhaps driven by a 
subcortical visuomotor pathway) implicitly carries the information that such stimuli are 
worth attending to and learning about.  If we ask where that information came from, we 
have to appeal to the infant’s evolutionary history, not its individual experience.  We can 
suppose that the bias is adaptive — it works well in the kinds of environments infants are 
likely to find themselves in.  The adaptive match between behavioural bias and usual 
environment is due to evolution, not individual learning. 
 The infant’s unlearnt behavioural bias is then sufficient to give a second system the 
input it needs to learn to reidentify individual faces.  Through being given the right kind of 
input, this learning system has the chance to extract the statistical properties that 
distinguish one face from another and the statistical invariants that signify the same face 
again.  Once trained up, the second system also implicitly encodes information: a rich store 
of information about which features indicate the same face (John, say).  Unlike the 
information in the initial visual tracking tendency, this latter match between system and 
                                                 
13  Carey also observes that the child makes a ‘leap’ when drawing a parallel between the operation of adding 
one object in the object file system and the process of counting on to the next item in the (initially 
uninterpreted) sequence of counting words. Shea (2011) argued that this is the step at which Fodor’s 
argument is circumvented, and that this step is not explicable as a rational transition from the content of 
pre-existing representational resources. 
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environment is not due to evolution, but to individual learning (from the experience of 
seeing John). 
 What contents are represented at these two stages of development?  The answer 
depends upon the correct theory of content, about which there is no consensus, so I will 
again deploy asymmetric dependence theory and infotel semantics.  At birth infants have 
the capacity to detect moving blobs and certain configurations of blobs.  Some internal 
state driving their looking behaviour covaries roughly with the presence of faces, but there 
do not seem to be asymmetric dependencies between the various kinds of information 
carried or, if there are, it is the capacity to detect faces that looks to be asymmetrically 
dependent on the capacity to detect configurations of blobs, rather than the other way 
round.  So, according to Fodor’s theory of content, infants do not represent faces at the 
outset.14  As a result of learning, the infant comes to be able to reidentify a particular 
individual, John say, by his face: the infant categorises together a variety of different views 
of John, and can engage in John-relevant behaviour as a result.  So the result is some 
internal vehicle which correlates with John, and may well have the right asymmetric 
dependence properties to count as a representation of John.  Thus, according to 
asymmetric dependence, the infant initially has no representation of faces at all, but then 
comes to have the ability to represent John by his face.    
 Infotel semantics also delivers the result that the capacity to represent John is not 
innate.  Since the visuomotor tracking bias present at birth seems to have the function of 
enabling learning about faces, it plausibly carries the content that’s a face, look at it, even 
though it is only able to identify faces very roughly at that stage.  So infotel semantics 
suggests that this basic capacity to represent faces is innate.  The capacity to represent the 
particular individual John is not innate.  Although, even at birth, there are features of the 
visual signal that correlate with the presence of John, these are not deployed by consumer 
systems in a John-relevant way.  Only once learning has taken place, so that the infant can 
reidentify John and thereby engage in John-relevant behaviour, will infotel semantics 
deliver any representations of John.  Thus, according to both theories of content, the 
capacity to represent John is not present initially, but only arises after the second system 
has done its job. 
 We have offered a psychological account of the development on the ability to 
represent John, but the transition to having a representation of John is not explicable-by 
content, whether asymmetric dependence or infotel semantics is the right theory of 
content.  The capacity to represent lines and blobs figures only causally in the development 
of the sustaining mechanism for the infant’s later representation of John. Having played its 
developmental role in selecting appropriate input, the initial visual tracking tendency plays 
no causal role in the synchronic operation of the sustaining mechanism (Johnson et al. 
1991). 
                                                 
14  Since it is not clear how the relevant counterfactuals are to be assessed, it is hard to reach definitive 
conclusions about how the theory will apply to specific cases. 
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 The developmental transition is not explained-by-content.  Instead, it makes use of 
resources characterised in terms of correlational information, which do not have the 
characteristics needed to count as representational, and builds them into sustaining 
mechanisms that do count as representational (according to both asymmetric dependence 
and infotel semantics).  Even before learning, the visual signal carries information, in the 
correlational sense, about particular faces.  There is something about the visual signal 
which correlates with looking at John, say — that is why statistical learning about individual 
faces works.  On no view does this correlational information, present in some complex form 
in the visual signal, count as representational at the initial stage.  But these information-
bearers play a causal role in the development of the mature ability to reidentify John.  The 
story of that developmental transition is an account of information-bearers being built up 
into a sustaining mechanism for a new representation.  It is a psychological story, but it is 
not explanation-by-content.  It is a psychological account of the creation of content. 
 Why is this developmental transition an instance of learning, rather than mere 
triggering or maturation?  Because it is a psychological process that involves extracting 
information from the environment.  The infant comes to represent a particular individual, 
John, by interacting with John.  If that were just triggering, it would be a mere accident 
that causal intercourse with John was needed to trigger maturation of the infant’s concept 
of John.15  By contrast, according to Morton and Johnson’s theory there is a very obvious 
reason why the ability to recognise John depends upon seeing John: because the learning 
process works by picking up statistical properties in visual signals that come from John  — 
properties that go with its being the same face again. 
 One way of confirming that the mature representation of John is not innate is by 
deploying a poverty of the stimulus argument.  A poverty of the stimulus argument is 
available about the neonate’s ability selectively to track things which tend to be faces.  So 
it is plausibly innate.  But there is no poverty of the stimulus argument available about the 
infant’s later ability to recognise John.  The infant’s John-recognition device implicitly 
encodes a wealth of information about which properties distinguish John’s face from other 
faces and which properties are invariant over different views of John’s face.  The infant 
does not rely on its evolutionary history for that information (and could not), but extracts 
that information from its experience of interacting with John.  So if Morton and Johnson are 
right, the infant’s capacity to represent individual faces is not innate.  Whether or not they 
are right, their theory provides a detailed example of how genuinely novel representations 
could be learnt. 
 In the last section we saw that PDP modelling of representational development opens 
up a new portion of logical space for cognitive science to explore: that representations are 
distributed over the resources that account for their development, breaking the link 
                                                 
15  Fodor says that interaction with doorknobs is needed to trigger the DOORKNOB concept because being a 
doorknob is a response-dependent property Fodor (1998).  Whether or not that response works for DOORKNOB, 
it is implausible that being John (a particular person) is a response-dependent property.  
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between psychological explanation and explanation-by-content.  In this section we saw that 





Fodor assumes that all psychological processes, including concept acquisition, are 
intentional, i.e. explicable-by-content.  All processes that are not susceptible to intentional 
explanation are bundled together under the label ‘innate’.  That puts acquiring the concept 
JOHN or CARBURETTOR by rich interactions with John or with actual carburettors on a par with 
acquiring such concepts via an accidental bump on the head.  But Fodor has given us a false 
dichotomy.  It is a familiar point that Fodor’s model of concept acquisition as hypothesis 
testing is too restrictive.  The further point is that representational acquisition need not be 
explicable-by-content at all, but may still be recognisably in the domain of psychological 
explanation. 
 This paper has shown that to be more than just a theoretical possibility.  
Connectionist models offer concrete examples of that process.  In order to see 
connectionist models as accounting for the development of new representations we have to 
reject the assumption that development of new representations can be explained-by-
content, an assumption that lies at the heart of Fodor’s critique of connectionism, and of 
his radical concept nativism.  This paper argues that we should reject that assumption and 
embrace the idea that some connectionist models show how new primitive representations 
can develop in response to the environment, without relying on pre-existing 
representational resources.  Connectionism’s answer to the question, ‘Over what are your 
representations distributed?’ opens up a new portion of logical space for cognitive science.  
Connectionist representations can be distributed over the objects that figure in an account 
of their development.  In that way, connectionist modelling has provided a deep 
philosophical insight and an important contribution to theoretical progress in cognitive 
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